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When Perry Watkins, an African American gay man, was drafted by
the United States Army in 1967 during the Vietnam Conflict, he had no
idea that he would eventually have to use legal proceedings to retain a
position in the Armed Forces.' Despite indicating on his pre-induction
physical form that he had "homosexual tendencies," he was found quali-
fied for admission and inducted into the Armed Forces.2 A year after
entering the Army, Watkins sought discharge by again stating that he had
"homosexual tendencies" and had even committed "sodomy" with other
members of the military. After a brief investigation, the Army found him
qualified to be retained in the Armed Forces.3 In 1975, the Army at-
tempted to discharge Watkins based on his sexual orientation but a review
board concluded that "there is no evidence suggesting that his behavior
has had either a degrading effect upon unit performance, morale or disci-
pline, or upon his own job performance." 4
At first, Watkins' race seems to have caused the Army to overlook
his sexual orientation. As Watkins notes: "Every white person I knew
from Tacoma who was gay and had checked [the homosexuality] box
'Yes' did not have to go into the service. They were called in and asked,
'What does this mean?' They said, 'It means I'm gay. I like to suck
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1. See generally Watkins v. United States Army, 551 F. Supp. 212 (W.D. Wash. 1982)
[hereinafter Watkins 1].
2. See id. at 215.
3. See id.
4. Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter
Watkins Il].
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dick.' 'Fine, You can go.'" 5 Similarly, in 1968, Watkins observes:
"There was another person who went to his commander and told him the
same damn thing and they let him go home. Of course, he was white.
Which I think also had something to do with it-he was white and I was
black." 6
The Army's policy of overlooking Watkins' homosexuality, how-
ever, changed in 1981 as the Cold War began to come to an end. Al-
though Watkins now desired to stay in the military, which he regarded as
his career, the Army commenced discharge proceedings against him
based entirely on evidence that had been available to it at the 1968 and
1975 discharge proceedings. This time, the review board concluded that
Watkins was not fit for service and should be discharged.7 His sexual
orientation became a more dominant concern of the Army as its need for
military personnel declined. An openly gay African American soldier
was no longer acceptable irrespective of his service record.
Watkins' 1982 discharge became the subject of a lengthy court pro-
ceeding that was not resolved until 1989. His legal battle is well known
in the gay and lesbian community because Watkins is one of the only gay
plaintiffs to prevail in a federal legal proceeding. Nonetheless, what is
distinctive about Watkins' case is the persistent attempt by the courts to
fashion a victory for Watkins without creating legal advances for gay
men and lesbians in the military or elsewhere. He prevailed on "estop-
pel"8 and "double jeopardy"9 grounds, not because the military's treat-
ment of gay men was unconstitutional.
When Michael Hardwick was arrested for drinking in public, as he
left his employment at a gay bar in Atlanta, he had no idea that the same
police officer would later arrest him in his own bedroom for a sodomy
violation.1" But in a complicated twist of errors-a mistake on a hearing
notice, an expired warrant for his arrest, and a sleepy friend in the living
room who mistakenly directed a police officer to his bedroom-Michael
Hardwick became the plaintiff in a landmark civil rights lawsuit to chal-
lenge Georgia's sodomy law. Michael's "crime" was engaging in mutual
5. Mary Ann Humphrey, Peny Watkins, in MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE 248
(1988), reprinted in WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 641, 649 (1997).
6. Id. at 645.
7. See Watkins 11, 837 F.2d at 1430.
8. See Watkins 1, 551 F. Supp. at 223.
9. See Watkins v. United States Army, 541 F. Supp. 249, 259 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
10. See generally Peter Irons, What Are You Doing in My Bedroom., in THE COURAGE OF
THEIR CONVICTIONS 392 (1988), reprinted in RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 217-25.
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oral sex with another man in his own bedroom. His "crime" made him
subject to arrest because he was openly identifiable as a gay man through
his employment at a gay bar. Had Michael Hardwick been employed in a
less "ghettoized" setting and resided in a more private situation, he would
not have found himself arrested for engaging in mutual oral sex.
Whereas Watkins' legal problems began when, as an African American
man, he found himself coercively subjected to the draft, Hardwick's legal
problems began when, as a working-class gay man, he found himself a
victim of police harassment. In both cases, these men found themselves
vulnerable to the state's coercion because they were a particularly disad-
vantaged subclass of the gay and lesbian community. The law of sexual
orientation, like the law of abortion,11 provides more protection for the
middle class than it does for the poor.
When W, an Australian lesbian, had two children as a result of arti-
ficial insemination in the late 1980s while living with her partner, G, she,
too, had no idea that she would become a well-known figure in the gay
and lesbian community because of her legal battles.12 Like Watkins and
Hardwick, she was not a highly privileged member of society. Aside
from a position as a kennel hand and counter clerk, she has been mostly
unemployed since the mid-1980s. G, too, had minimal income until her
father died in 1994, leaving her a substantial estate. When W and G
separated in 1994, G refused to assist financially in the raising of the
children that had been born to W with G's alleged encouragement. In the
first decision of its kind in a common law legal system, the Supreme
Court of New South Wales ordered G to provide a lump sum payment to
be used to purchase annuities to help support the children.13 W, a work-
ing-class lesbian who found herself in financial distress, was able to ob-
tain relief through legal proceedings in Australia.
Similarly, gay men and lesbians have increasingly been able to use
the Canadian legal system to gain relief in cases involving their families
and employment situations. In 1992, the Canadian Federal Court held
that a discharge from the military following an admission of homosexual-
11. Compare Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
12. See generally W v. G, 1996 NSW LEXIS 2458 (Supreme Court of New South Wales
Feb. 2, 1996).
13. Child custody cases in the United States have generally involved situations where one
of the parents seeks visitation following the dissolution of the adult relationship. The lesbian
co-parent has lost in virtually all of these cases. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27 (1991).
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ity violated plaintiffs equality rights under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.14 In Haig v. Canada,15 the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal concluded that it was discriminatory for the Canadian Human Rights
Act to omit "sexual orientation" from its list of grounds for unlawful dis-
crimination. Applying that rule, it concluded that it was unlawful for a
captain in the Canadian Armed Forces to be denied eligibility for promo-
tion and career training when he revealed that he was a homosexual.' 6
United States Supreme Court precedent, as enunciated in Bowers v.
Hardwick,7 has left gay men and lesbians outside of the protection of the
Constitution. Judges like Ninth Circuit Judge Reinhardt have found
themselves bound by Bowers and therefore unable to rule on behalf of
homosexual plaintiffs. Reinhardt dissented from the decision in Watkins
II, acknowledging that "homosexuals have been unfairly treated both
historically and in the United States today" and that "proper interpreta-
tion of constitutional principles" would provide them constitutional pro-
tection.18 Yet he felt bound by the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in
Bowers which left homosexuals unprotected by the Constitution. 9 Rein-
hardt's dissent acknowledges the obvious-that equality principles do not
extend to constitutional decision-making when plaintiffs are gay men or
lesbians in the United States. 20
A close examination of gay rights litigation in the United States re-
veals the twin themes of militarism and moralism that underlie American-
style capitalism. Militarism has a complicated relationship with Ameri-
can capitalism. The disproportionate subsidization of the military has a
long-standing history in American politics. During the New Deal era,
America briefly experimented with becoming a social welfare state in
which all workers would be guaranteed minimum wages and benefits.
Following World War II, however, social welfare policies became mini-
mal except where veterans were concerned. "Hence the war brought
what the New Deal reformers had hoped to avoid: a special welfare state
for a substantial sector of the population deemed especially deserving.
The social reformism of the New Deal had been channeled into expanded
14. See Douglas v. R. [1992] 98 D.L.R. (4th) 129.
15. [1992] 94 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
16. See id. at 4.
17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
18. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1353 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1356-57.
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public provision for veterans, making it henceforth less likely that estab-
lishment of a national welfare state could be completed.""1 By contrast,
Great Britain enacted sweeping social reforms during this same period
which were available to all members of society, not just veterans.' The
United States has continued to expand its subsidization of the military
while largely abandoning its New Deal aspirations of a social welfare
state. "[T]he New Deal dream of national social and economic policies
to meet the many needs of all Americans had been dissolved by the do-
mestic politics of the war years. The dream would not soon reappear,
and never again in the same way."'
In more recent times, while the Republican Congress has attempted
to end government-sanctioned support of industry by eliminating the De-
partment of Commerce, it has also insisted on approving more money for
military spending than was proposed by the Clinton administration. Lais-
sez-faire Republicans have not been willing to acknowledge the lessened
need for military spending at the end of the Cold'War. Newt Gingrich,
for example, portrays a world full of "clever countries" that are trying to
"learn how to cope with an American military force." 24 But the real rea-
son to support outmoded and unnecessary military technology in the post-
Cold War era seems to be "keeping the B-2 contractors in business."'
Thus, although a large military-industrial complex may be historically
understood as a response to communism, it now has a life of its own.
That life contradicts the laissez-faire principles of capitalism by standing
as the most subsidized part of the American economy.
The treatment of gays in the military, however, cannot be explained
solely by reference to American deference to the stated needs of the
military. After all, excluding individuals like Watkins deprives the mili-
tary of highly qualified personnel, and makes little sense in a country de-
voted to a powerful military. The explanation for the adverse treatment
of gays in the military requires reference to the moralism underlying
American-style capitalism. Republican Dick Armey argues that democ-
racy and capitalism derive from a higher power.2 Irving Kristol, the fa-
21. Edwin Arnenta & Theda Skocpol, Redefining the New Deal: World War II and the
Development of Social Provision in the United States, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN
THE UNITED STATES 94 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 122.
24. LEONARD SILK & MARK SILK, MAKING CAPITALISM WORK 159 (1996).
25. Id. at 162.
26. See id. at 167.
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ther of neoconservatism, claims that any attack on religion is an attack on
capitalism.' This moralistic perspective has prevented the United States
from opening the doors of privilege to all its members.
Legal moralism in the United States has not been limited to claims
involving military service. When gay men and lesbians sought to use the
legal system's promise of gender equality to have marriage extended to
them on the same basis as heterosexuals, the Wall Street Journal pub-
lished an opinion piece criticizing the court's intervention into a matter
that should be decided by the people. 8 As a proponent of laissez-faire
capitalism, the Wall Street Journal should have published an article de-
scribing the economic inefficiency of allowing some members of our so-
ciety, but not others, to take advantage of the economic advantages of
marriage. Capitalists pretend that extension of benefits to gay men and
lesbians constitutes "special protection" rather than formal equality to
avoid the application of laissez-faire principles to gay men and lesbians.
Legal academics suffer from the same blind spot. Richard Posner's
willingness to accede to moralistic arguments is quite apparent in his
book, Sex and Reason.29 In discussing the gay marriage issue, Posner
acknowledges that "authorizing homosexual marriage would have many
collateral effects, simply because marriage is a status rich in entitle-
ments. "30 After recognizing that granting these benefits to gay men and
lesbians would have moral and political implications, he concludes:
"These questions ought to be faced one by one rather than elided by con-
ferring all the rights of marriage in a lump on homosexuals willing to un-
dergo a wedding ceremony."31 Laissez-faire principles get abandoned in
the name of deferring to moralism when the rights of gay and lesbian
people are at stake.
Capitalism and homophobia share no inherent functional relation-
ship. Capitalism is based on laissez-faire principles which seek to attain
economic efficiency by allowing each individual in society to realize his
or her potential without state interference. Yet American law is not even-
handed when it considers the rights of gay and lesbian people in compari-
son to heterosexuals. American capitalism is a peculiarly moralistic and
militaristic version of capitalism. Rather than make moral arguments,
27. See id. at 168.
28. See Melanie Kirkpatrick, Rule of Law: Gay Marriage: Who Should Dedde?, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 13, 1996, at A15.
29. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
30. Id. at 313.
31. Id.
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such as that gay people deserve to be treated worse than others, Ameri-
can capitalists often hide their moral disgust with special treatment argu-
ments.
There is one seeming contradiction to this account-Romer v. Ev-
ans32--the Colorado ballot initiative case in which the United States Su-
preme Court overturned Amendment 2. Adrhittedly, this case does ex-
tend formal equality principles to gay men and lesbians. Nevertheless,
this case is consistent with American-style laissez-faire capitalism because
it refuses to recognize the historical mistreatment of gay men and lesbians
and renders its decision in a manner which upholds the anti-affirmative
action bias of American law. The decision leaves in place the moralism
and militarism underlying American law.
I. Constitutional Law
A. The Bad News
It should not surprise us that Michael Hardwick, a gay bartender,
lost his constitutional claim to privacy in Bowers v. Hardwick.3 3 Not
having been able to afford to purchase privacy in his life, he could not
expect the courts to provide him with constitutional protection. Although
strict application of laissez-faire principles should result in the govern-
ment not interfering with the private sexual practices of gay men and les-
bians, as it does not interfere with the private sexual practices of middle-
class heterosexuals,34 the Court refused to extend such principles to those
individuals. The state's justification for the sodomy law in Bowers was
the "presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that ho-
mosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. "35 The Supreme Court
concluded that such justification is sufficient to uphold a law which in-
fringes on the private sexual activity of adults. As Chief Justice Burger
stated in his concurrence in Bowers, "To hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast
aside millennia of moral teaching."36 The Court therefore refused to ap-
ply the laissez-faire doctrine of privacy, as developed in the contraception
32. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
33. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
34. For a general discussion of privacy and heterosexual sex, see Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), and its progeny.
35. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
36. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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and abortion cases, to homosexuals. As the dissent noted, "The legiti-
macy of secular legislation depends.., on whether the State can advance
some justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine.
. . *A state can no more punish private behavior because of religious
intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.""
The dissent's argument would be valid if gay men and lesbians received
constitutional protection. Because their claims lie outside the realm of
constitutional protection, moral arguments are allowed to justify in-
fringement of their liberty interests.
Similarly, the courts have continuously denied claims by gay men
and lesbians that they should be entitled to engage in military service on
the same basis as heterosexuals. In cases brought under the equality
doctrine (unlike Watkins), the plaintiffs have consistently lost. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit accepted the argument that "sexual tensions
and attractions could play havoc with a military unit's discipline and soli-
darity."38 Relying on the precedent of Bowers, the Thonasson court also
noted that "[g]iven it is legitimate for Congress to proscribe homosexual
acts, it is also legitimate for the government to seek to forestall these
same dangers by trying to prevent the commission of such acts." 39 As
Judge Hall, dissenting in Thomasson, observed, these kinds of arguments
are used to support white male supremacy. "'Unit cohesion' is a facile
way for the ins to put a patina of rationality on their efforts to exclude the
outs. The concept has therefore been a favorite of those who, through
the years, have resisted the irresistible erosion of white male domination
of the armed forces."' The United States Constitution, however, has not
yet been interpreted to protect gay men and lesbians from the forces of
"white male domination." Free speech arguments under the First
Amendment have similarly been unavailable to gay men and lesbians in
the military despite the explicit silencing of speech intended by the cur-
rent "don't ask, don't tell" policy in the Armed Forces.41
Until recently, the Canadian courts also refused to allow gay men
and lesbians to receive constitutional protection. In 1993, the Ontario
37. Id. at 212 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
38. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 929 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
39. Id. at 929.
40. Id. at 952 (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
41. Cf. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that prior
Army policy which provided for the discharge of any soldier who "evidenced homosexual ten-




Court (General Division) ruled in a 2-1 decision that it did not violate the
equality provision in the Charter of Rights for two men to be denied the
right to seek a marriage license. 2 In a curious turn of logic, the court
found that there was no sexual orientation discrimination because the
marriage law does not prohibit gay people from marrying, it only prohib-
its them from marrying someone of the same sex.43 Similarly, a month
earlier in 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that it did not
constitute unlawful "family status" discrimination for a man to be denied
bereavement leave to attend the funeral of the father of his same-sex
partner although the court clearly left open the question whether such a
rule would constitute sexual orientation discrimination.' In a stinging
dissent, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 surveyed literature on the structure of
the urban black family in the United States and argued: "While the
structure of the family may be a question of choice for some, for others
the structure of family may be in part a natural response to social and po-
litical pressures."'4 In other words, she saw the connection between eco-
nomics and family structure and did not presume that the state should use
its power to coerce people into conventional family arrangements in order
to make claims for benefits.
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Egan v. The Queen46
that the infringement of equality was justifiable in a case involving the
federal old age security legislation. This law provides an allowance to
the spouse of a pensioner, defining "spouse" as a person of the opposite
sex. Although the Court found that such a definition did violate the right
to equality as guaranteed by Section 15 of the Charter, the Court also
found that such discrimination was constitutional under Section 1 of the
Charter. The holding was based on a desire to preserve the heterosexual
family unit. The majority acknowledged that the purpose of the rule was
to support the "heterosexual family unit." "It is the social unit that
uniquely has the capacity to procreate children and generally cares for
their upbringing, and as such warrants support by Parliament to meet its
needs.... [This is the unit in society that fundamentally anchors other
42. See Re Layland v. Ontario Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations [1993]
104 D.L.R. (4th) 214.
43. See id. The argument does not appear to have been made that the rule constituted sex
discrimination. See id.
44. See Canada Attorney-General v. Mossop [1993] 100 D.L.R. (4th) 658.
45. Id. at 708.
46. [1995] 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609.
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social relationships and other aspects of society., 47 Like the cases in the
United States, this case merged moralism with laissez-faire capitalism.
Although the general rule, as acknowledged by the Court, was to extend
benefits without regard to sexual orientation, the Court allowed the gov-
ernment to violate that rule in order to benefit the traditional, heterosex-
ual family unit comprised of a wage earner, dependent spouse, and chil-
dren.
Nonetheless, there have been many successful legal attempts to at-
tain same-sex partner supplemental health care benefits through constitu-
tional challenges in the last several years in Canada. One of the first suc-
cessful challenges came from the province of Manitoba. Chris Vogel had
been a regular full-time employee of the Government of Manitoba since
1973.48 In 1974, he participated in a marriage ceremony conducted by
the Unitarian Church but, because his partner was of the same sex, the
Registrar of Vital Statistics refused to register the marriage. Some of his
employment benefits included benefits to his "spouse" such as dental in-
surance, a semi-private hospital plan, an extended health plan, and vari-
ous pension and survivor's benefits. The Manitoba court concluded that
the exclusion of homosexual partners from the employee benefits pro-
gram constituted discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and re-
ferred the case back to the human rights adjudicator for decision. While
recognizing that it might be difficult for the legislature to reach this deci-
sion, the Manitoba court said, "We can't say we are too busy with other
things or that the issue is too politically sensitive or set up a Royal Com-
mission. We do our duty and decide."49 Rather than duck the issue, the
court therefore applied traditional principles of equality doctrine to con-
clude that sexual orientation discrimination underlies the employee benefit
program.
Similarly, in M. v. H.,'° the Ontario trial court concluded in 1996
that it was unconstitutional for the spousal support law to exclude same-
sex couples from coverage. In this case, it was clear that the courts
achieved a result that was not possible in the legislature. In 1993, the
Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended that same-sex couples
should receive some legislative recognition. In 1994, the Equality Rights
Statute Amendment Act, Bill 167, was put forward in the Ontario legis-
47. Id. at 626-27.
48. See generally Vogel v. Government of Manitoba [1995] 126 D.L.R. (4th) 72.
49. Id. at 74 (quoting Justice Antonio Lamer, Chief Justice of Canada).
50. [1996] 132 D.L.R. (4th) 538.
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lature. The bill was defeated and has not been reintroduced. Further,
the government's actions with respect to this litigation shows how hard it
is to achieve governmental consensus on this issue. Initially, the Attor-
ney General intervened in the case in support of the plaintiff. Then, after
the 1995 election, the Attorney General filed another brief supporting the
defendant. As the court found: "It is simply not realistic to regard the
current state of Ontario law pertaining to spousal support as merely part
of a process of legislative reform."51 After considering various argu-
ments for judicial deference, the court decided to move forward and grant
relief to the plaintiff.
In more recent cases, the Canadian courts have been increasingly
willing to accord same-sex couples the family rights of married partners
by examining the cases as sexual orientation cases. In a 1995 decision,
Re Metro Toronto Reference Library and Canadian Union of Public Em-
ployees ("C. U.P.E. "), Loc. 1582,52 the arbitrator resolved the issue left
open by Mossop-whether a denial of bereavement leave to a same-sex
partner constituted sexual orientation discrimination. The arbitrator an-
swered this question in the affirmative. While United States courts have
consistently refused to recognize the inappropriateness of discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, Canadian courts increasingly recognize
the history of prejudice and hatred against gay and lesbian people.
Rather than try to twist gay rights arguments into gender arguments, they
deal with them directly as arguments based on the inappropriateness of
sexual orientation discrimination. They are not afraid to confront directly
the moral arguments made to support sexual orientation discrimination.
Despite some early losses in arbitration cases,53 the current trend is
to extend rights to same-sex couples in that judicial arena as well. In Re
Bell Canada and Canadian Telephone Employees' Association,54 the ar-
bitrator ruled that spousal benefits must be accorded to same-sex couples
in order to comply with the Canadian Human Rights Act. Those benefits
included a pension plan, survivor protection benefits and various health
51. M. v. H. [1996] 132 D.L.R. at 563.
52. [1995] 51 L.A.C. (4th) 80.
53. See generally Re Freshwater Fish Marketing Corp. and United Steelworkers of
America, Local 561 [1995] 49 L.A.C. (4th) 139, 159; Re Canada Post Corp. and Public Serv-
ice Alliance of Canada [1993] 34 L.A.C. (4th) 104, 105; Re Parkwood Hospital and McCor-
mick Home [1992] 24 L.A.C. (4th) 149, 163; Re Treasury Board (Indian & Northern Affairs)
and Watson [1990] 11 L.A.C. (4th) 129, 132; Re Carleton University and C.U.P.E., Local
2424 [1988] 35 L.A.C. (3d) 96, 107.
54. [1994] 43 L.A.C. (4th) 172.
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care benefits beyond those offered automatically by the government. The
arbitrator concluded that unlawful discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation had occurred. Similarly, in Re Treasury Board (Environment
Canada) and Lorenzen,55 the arbitrator concluded that an employer vio-
lated the collective bargaining agreement and the Canadian Human Rights
Act by not allowing bereavement and family leave to be accorded to a
same-sex partner. The arbitrator did not even have to reach the Human
Rights Act issue because he concluded that the term "spouse" as used in
the collective bargaining agreement could include partners in same-sex
couples. In the absence of the use of the terms "husband and wife," he
concluded that such an interpretation was reasonable.
Although Australian courts have not gone so far as to conclude that
same-sex relationships should be directly recognized as marriages, they
have extended the benefits of the law of marriage to same-sex couples in
divorce-like proceedings. In W v. G,56 the plaintiff had two children
through artificial insemination while involved in a long-term relationship
with another woman. When the relationship ended, plaintiff sued for
child support under an equitable estoppel theory that plaintiff had acted in
reliance upon promises made by defendant to help support and raise the
children. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held for the plaintiff,
granting the plaintiff a lump sum payment to be used to purchase annui-
ties to help support the children.
The Australian decision is, in many respects, a classic example of
laissez-faire decision-making. The sexual orientation of the parties
played no role in the decision. The court simply applied long-standing
equitable principles to a case involving a same-sex couple. Moralistic ar-
guments did not influence the judgment, thereby allowing the court to
extend the protection of the law in an even-handed manner. No court in
the United States has been willing to apply such equitable principles to
cases involving children raised by same-sex couples. The Australian de-
cision is therefore remarkable for what it does not do. It does not apply
moral blinders to prevent same-sex couples from receiving the benefits of
the law.
But the New South Wales decision also has limited implications.
This is not a case where an intact same-sex couple is trying to take ad-
vantage of benefits accorded to heterosexual couples like health insur-
55. [1993] 38 L.A.C. (4th) 29.




ance, tax benefits, etc. Instead, this is a case where one member of a
relationship has a claim against the other. The victory for the lesbian
plaintiff is a loss for the lesbian defendant. The court has therefore al-
lowed standard legal principles to govern the income redistribution as
between two lesbians. It would be a far more radical step for the court to
allow a same-sex couple to take advantage of general societal benefits
that are exclusively reserved for heterosexuals. Then, the gay or lesbian
plaintiffs would be making a claim against the resources of society, in
general, rather than a claim against the resources of the members of their
own community.
B. The Good News
The decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court to apply equality doc-
trine to a marriage claim by a same-sex couple has been heralded as a
great victory in the gay and lesbian community. But the Hawaii court
couched its decision in gender rather than sexual orientation terms and
therefore has not had to confront directly the moral arguments used in the
United States to justify sexual orientation discrimination. In Baehr v.
Lewin,57 the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the Hawaii marriage statute
presumptively constituted unconstitutional discrimination based on sex.
The court's decision completely ignored the sexual orientation of the pe-
titioners; in fact, it was not even considered to be a relevant fact to the
court's decision. Observing simply that an individual could marry a man
only if she were a woman, the court concluded that the marriage rule
constituted a sex-based rule. The fact that the historical origins of such a
rule reflected animus on the basis of sexual orientation rather than gender
was not relevant to the court's decision. Its decision reflected an analysis
of the language, rather than the intent or history, of the challenged stat-
ute. By employing such an analysis, the court was able to rule for the
petitioners without reaching the thorny question of whether discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation should be tolerated.
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court handed gay rights activists
their first major victory before the highest court in a 6-3 decision in Ro-
mer v. Evans.58 The Supreme Court held that the voters of the state of
Colorado acted unconstitutionally when they approved an amendment to
their state constitution which would prohibit all legislative, executive or
judicial action designed to protect the rights of any gay, lesbian or bisex-
57. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
58. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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ual person on the basis of their sexual orientation. Although gay rights
activists have heralded Romer as "a landmark civil-rights ruling,"59 the
Supreme Court's decision in that case is actually consistent with its trend
toward acceptance of the principles of formal equality and avoidance of
moral issues in gay rights cases. This case can be understood as consis-
tent with the anti-affirmative action backlash described in my previous
work.6° It may reflect a short-term victory for gay and lesbian people but
also reflects a long-term trend toward undermining affirmative action. It
also says nothing about overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, therefore still
leaving gay men and lesbians outside of the protection of the Constitu-
tion.
The Wall Street Journal has grasped this connection. In an editorial
following the Romer decision, the Journal said that it was "cheered" to
see Justice Kennedy recite the famous line from Plessy v. Ferguson that
the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens "61
because that statement clarifies that the Court "is starting to make color-
blindness a reality."' As the Journal noted, the doctrine underlying Ro-
mer better reflects the anti-affirmative action backlash than a positive
statement about the rights of gay and lesbian people. The author of the
Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy, applied the formal equality principles
that he had previously applied to reverse discrimination cases in order to
overturn the Colorado amendment. The doctrine that he applied was not
novel; what was novel was his willingness to extend that doctrine to a
case despite the fact that it involved gay and lesbian petitioners.
The surprising result for someone who expects the Court to follow
principles of formal equality and laissez-faire capitalism in an even-
handed manner is that Justices Scalia, Rehnquist and Thomas filed strong
dissents. Despite their stance as the strongest proponents of the formal
equality doctrine on the Court, they could not leave aside their moralistic
impulses and extend those principles to gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals.
They had to lump the case into the "special treatment" category in order
59. Paul Barrett, Court Rejects Ban on Laws Protecting Gays, WALL ST. J., May 21,
1996, at BI (quoting Suzanne B. Goldberg, a staff attorney with the Lambda Legal Defense
Fund).
60. See generally RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS AND OTHER
MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW 195-232 (1996).
61. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Ro-
mer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
62. Editorial, Rethinking Equality, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1996, at A20.
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to rationalize the failure to apply principles of formal equality to gay and
lesbian petitioners.
"The amendment prohibits special treatment of homosexuals, and
nothing more,"' 3 argued Justice Scalia in his vigorous dissent from the
majority's holding. According to Scalia:
[Tihe principle [that underlies the majority's opinion] is that one who is
accorded equal treatment under the laws, but cannot as readily as others
obtain preferential treatment under the laws, has been denied equal
protection of the laws. If merely stating this alleged "equal protection"
violation does not suffice to refute it, our constitutional jurisprudence
has achieved terminal silliness.
4
Scalia, whose opinions are usually known for their close reading of
the text, has to ignore completely the language of the challenged amend-
ment in order to arrive at that conclusion. It is true that the amendment
would prohibit special treatment on behalf of gay, lesbian and bisexual
people since it prohibits any "quota preferences" for such groups. But it
is also true that the amendment prohibits anti-discrimination protection as
well. It states quite clearly that branches of government may not "enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or rela-
tionships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person
or class of persons to have . .. [any] claim of discrimination."6 As
stated by the majority, the amendment would invalidate nondiscrimination
ordinances passed by the cities of Denver and Boulder.' It took no
grand constitutional analysis to apply the plain language of the amend-
ment to the plain language of the local ordinances. In fact, although
Scalia accuses the majority of "terminal silliness," he offers no alterna-
tive interpretation of the amendment as applied to the Boulder and Den-
ver ordinances. Nondiscrimination can no longer be offered to gay, les-
bian and bisexual people after the adoption of Amendment 2. It is this
nondiscrimination principle which Justice Kennedy proclaimed must be
protected by the Equal Protection Clause, no more and no less.
Scalia sets up the case as a special protection case so that he does not
have to distinguish it from the long line of formal equality cases that he
has followed so passionately. The legal question that he asserts underlies
63. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
64. Id.




this case is "whether there was a legitimate rational basis for the sub-
stance of the constitutional amendment-for the prohibition of special
protection for homosexuals." 67 He then chides the majority for avoiding
discussion of this question "since the answer is so obviously yes. " 8
Scalia is correct that virtually no group, and certainly not a group com-
prised of gay men and lesbians, can make a constitutional claim for spe-
cial protection under existing jurisprudence. The majority fails to ask
that question because it is irrelevant to the case before the Court.
Amendment 2 is not unconstitutional under existing doctrine because it
prohibits special treatment for gay men and lesbians but because it also
invalidates laws which promise equal treatment. Scalia fails to explain
why gay men and lesbians are not "persons" who, like white heterosex-
ual men, are entitled to the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Romer are ships passing in
the night because they ask and answer entirely different questions. Juris-
prudentially, however, they actually seem to agree on a core principle-
that gay men and lesbians are not entitled to special protection. Both the
majority and minority opinions are premised on a commitment to formal
equality. The dissent has to distort the plain meaning of Amendment 2 to
force it out of formal equality doctrine.
The dissent's distortion of the language of Amendment 2 is done to
placate the moralism of Colorado voters. Even Scalia has to admit that
the Colorado voters were trying to "preserve traditional sexual mores"
through the passage of Amendment 2,69 although he also tries to hide
their moralism by describing them as "seemingly tolerant. 7
Had Scalia been truly committed to the values of laissez-faire capi-
talism, rather than the values of the so-called moral majority, he would
have had to note the inefficiency of allowing the Colorado voters to en-
force their sexual prejudices through law. Tolerance is a basic value un-
der laissez-faire capitalism so it must have disturbed Scalia to have an ex-
ample of a direct disregard for tolerance. Thus, not only does he misread
Amendment 2 but he goes so far as to misstate the attitude of the voters
by calling them "tolerant" while they try to enforce their own sexual
prejudices. The dissonance within Scalia's opinion rings loudly despite
67. Id. at 1631.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1629.
70. See id.
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his attempt to use rhetorical flourishes to distract the reader from its un-
derlying inconsistency.
There is no better example of the inconsistency of American-style
laissez-faire capitalism than Scalia's opinion in Romer. It exposes the
true values that underlie his oft-stated commitment to formal equality.
Sexual moralism excuses adherence to the constitutional principles of
equality under the law.
II. Statutory Law
A. Sex Discrimination
When Ernest Dillon7' and Mario Carreno' 2 were subjected to re-
peated graffiti with statements such as "Dillon gives head" or had their
genitals and buttocks caressed by co-workers, they were denied protec-
tion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because their claims
were considered to be based on sexual orientation rather than sex. They
were not allowed to use Title VII to gain protection for themselves as gay
men. Yet, when Robin McCoy, a female, brought suit under Title VII
because her female supervisor allegedly rubbed McCoy's breasts, rubbed
between McCoy's legs, and forced her tongue into McCoy's mouth while
also calling McCoy "stupid poor white trash" and "stupid poor white
bitch," McCoy prevailed. 3 Instead of branding the case as one based on
sexual orientation, the court found that it fit the standard rules for sexual
harassment. United States courts have therefore allowed Title VII to be
used against lesbian or gay male supervisor-employees but have not al-
lowed Title VII to be used on their behalf.74
This complicated web of case law makes sense when one appreciates
the moralistic agenda underlying the courts' interpretation of Title VII.
Title VII is interpreted to protect the chastity of heterosexual women and
protect heterosexual men from sexual advances from other men. But it is
not designed to extend any comparable protection to gay men and lesbi-
ans. No matter how horrendously they are sexualized at the workplace,
they do not receive protection from such sexualization by the courts.
71. See Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 (6th Cir. 1992).
72. See Carreno v. IBEW Local No. 226, No. 89-4083-S, 1990 WL 159199 (D. Kan.
1990).
73. See McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Services, 878 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D. Ga.
1995).
74. See id.
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Only individuals who are perceived by the courts to be heterosexuals re-
ceive protection from sexualization.
Application of pure laissez-faire principles would, of course, result
in the repeal of Title VII. And Richard Epstein, as a pure proponent of
such principles, does call for the repeal of all anti-discrimination laws.75
But Epstein's approach is not the dominant approach under American
law. Instead, the courts interpret existing anti-discrimination doctrine so
as to further a homophobic, moralistic agenda.
This awkward interpretation of Title VII is not inevitable under
capitalism. Canadian courts have not excluded gay and lesbian workers
from the law of sex discrimination. While United States courts have re-
fused to find that gay and lesbian people are protected against same-sex
harassment at the workplace, Canadian courts have found such harass-
ment unlawful. In Re Cami Automotive Inc. and Canadian Auto Work-
ers, Local 88,76 the court assumed that sexual harassment discrimination
would violate the collective bargaining agreement. The only issue in dis-
pute was a technical one-whether the aggrieved party had given suffi-
cient notice of his inability to work because of the harassment. While
finding that he had not given sufficient notice at the time, the arbitrator
found that he should have been reinstated when a psychiatrist finally pro-
vided justification more than six months later.' Unlike the United States,
the arbitrator was dealing in a context where both the collective bargain-
ing agreement and human rights ordinance forbid sexual orientation dis-
crimination.
B. Employment Nondiscrimination Act
Because the courts have refused to interpret the Constitution or Title
VII to extend protection to gay men and lesbians, the only legal recourse
for gay men and lesbians has been to persuade the legislature to pass new
statutes for their protection. A key strategy of the gay rights movement
in the last several years has been to gain passage of the Employment
Nondiscrimination Act ("ENDA") 78-a federal statute designed to pro-
vide protection from employment discrimination for gay men and lesbi-
ans.
75. See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 9 (1992) (arguing that the
.entire apparatus of the anti-discrimination laws in Title VII should be repealed insofar as it
applies to private employers") (emphasis added).
76. See [1994] 45 L.A.C. (4th) 71.
77. See id. at 108.
78. S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996).
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In order to gain passage of this legislation in a Republican Congress,
the proponents have had to draft the statute quite narrowly in order to
make it minimally acceptable to American politicians. They have tried to
structure the statute around laissez-faire principles by having it reflect
principles of formal equality and intrude as little as possible into the
economy of the workplace.
Knowing that any affirmative rights for gay and lesbian people
would immediately receive a strong negative response, the drafters of
ENDA carefully eliminated any vestiges of affirmative treatment in the
statute. The statute generally provides that employers not be permitted to
"discriminate against an individual on the basis of sexual orientation. 7 9
The two possible "special treatment" arguments that could have been
made against the statute were specifically eliminated through the statutory
language. First, section five of the statute provides that it "does not ap-
ply to the provision of employee benefits to an individual for the benefit
of such individual's partner." 0 In other words, employers could con-
tinue to offer health insurance benefits to the partners of heterosexuals
but not to the partners of gay people, even if ENDA became law. Sec-
ond, section seven of the statute provides that a "covered entity shall not
adopt or implement a quota on the basis of sexual orientation" and that a
"covered entity shall not give preferential treatment to an individual on
the basis of sexual orientation." Even voluntary affirmative action be-
comes unlawful under ENDA although it is not entirely unlawful under
Title VII.
Not only does the statute not require (or even pernit) any type of
"special treatment," but it exempts the armed services and religious in-
stitutions from coverage, thereby honoring the twin principles of moral-
ism and militarism. The net effect of these exclusions and qualifications
is that many of the gay rights issues that are currently being hotly liti-
gated-gays in the military and health insurance benefits for same-sex
couples-are not effected by the passage of ENDA. Nonetheless, Sena-
tor Dole criticized ENDA as a "special treatment" statute during the 1996
presidential campaign. When asked during the second Presidential debate
whether he supported the "Employment Nondiscrimination Act" [ENDA]
(which would ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the
workplace), Senator Dole responded that he did not favor "special rights
79. Id.
80. Id. § 5.
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for any group, " " strongly implying that ENDA constituted "special
treatment legislation." But, of course, ENDA cannot be arguably char-
acterized as special treatment legislation.
An interesting question is what are the implications of the exclusions
and exceptions found in the current version of ENDA. Can any class-
wide effects be discerned from the compromises that were made in the
hope of eventual passage of ENDA under American capitalism? The
employee benefit exclusion is important to those members of the gay
community who live in a household where one person holds health insur-
ance benefits and the other person does not. Since health insurance bene-
fits are more likely to exist at a workplace for middle-class, full-time em-
ployees, this problem is most likely to be acute in households where one
individual holds a blue-collar job, works part-time or is unemployed.
What are these households likely to look like? Women, on average, hold
much less lucrative employment than men. Thus, a relationship consist-
ing of two women is much more likely to face this problem than a house-
hold consisting of two men. The AIDS crisis has also, of course, dispro-
portionately affected gay men. To the extent that the AIDS crisis has
also impoverished households after one individual becomes unable to
work, but still must seek medical treatment, this exclusion will effect
many poor households consisting of two men.
The AIDS crisis has caused many people in the gay community to
begin to support a system of nationalized health insurance, because it has
brought home how important the health insurance issue is to basic sur-
vival. Yet, when the gay community itself proposes national anti-
discrimination legislation, it ironically finds that it cannot put health in-
surance on the table for fear that such a measure would derail the entire
bill. In other words, capitalist opposition to national health insurance
seeps into the debate about a nondiscrimination bill covering the private
82sector.
The impact of the affirmative action language might also be felt on a
class-defined basis. First, one must ask-where does affirmative action
currently exist that it might end? Few mainstream employers have any
kind of affirmative action program which includes gay people. Yet,
81. See N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at B9 (excerpts from second televised debate between
Clinton and Dole held on October 16, 1996).
82. In the same presidential debate, Senator Dole was careful to link the Democrats with
support of national health insurance-something he thought flew in the face of American capi-
talism for most voters. He therefore was playing the capitalism theme. See id.
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within the gay community, one might argue that gay-owned businesses
such as bars, clubs and restaurants have affirmative action policies in that
they are likely to want to hire "one of their own" to work at establish-
ments that cater to the gay community. Further, it may be that such
businesses often offer salaries at the low end of the wage spectrum since
service jobs are usually low paying. The effect of ENDA might be to
generate reverse discrimination cases against gay-owned establishments.
Even if these establishments did not have any formal or informal policy
of preferring gay applicants, a heterosexual may be able to convince a
conservative judge or jury that such a policy existed.83 Thus, ENDA
might foster an attack on the gay community and gay institutions while
having a disproportionate impact against the gay men and lesbians who
hold such service-industry jobs.84
Nondiscrimination legislation on the basis of sexual orientation in
Canada has not suffered from these kinds of class-based problems. Un-
like the American model, where a new statute was drafted to respond to
sexual orientation discrimination, Canadian provinces and the federal
government have tackled the problem of discrimination against gay men
and lesbians by amending their existing nondiscrimination legislation to
include sexual orientation. Since the existing nondiscrimination laws in
Canada do protect affirmative action, the amendment of those laws to in-
clude sexual orientation does not prevent affirmative action on the basis
of sexual orientation. The health care issue in Canada does not pose the
same kind of problem for gay and lesbian people in Canada as in the
United States because all individuals have health insurance through their
provincial government irrespective of their employment or familial status.
Family-related issues only arise with respect to supplemental benefits
(e.g., dental or vision insurance) that may not be offered as part of the
minimum, provincial plan. These supplemental benefits are sometimes
provided through employers and, as in the United States, are not neces-
sarily made available to the same-sex partners of employees.
I. Conclusion
At first glance, the American law of sexual orientation appears to be
chaotic. But when one examines the law through the lens of moralism
83. Given the way Title VII has been used to harm but not benefit gay men and lesbians,
this result would not be surprising.
84. Michael Hardwick's job as a bartender in a gay bar would be in jeopardy.
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and militarism, it comes into focus. Laissez-faire economic principles
are abandoned by conservatives like Justice Scalia when faced with an is-
sue affecting gay men and lesbians. Laissez-faire economic principles
are abandoned by the United States Congress and the courts when the
American military needs to be defended. These results are not inevitable
under capitalism. Other capitalist countries manage to extend constitu-
tional and statutory protection to gay men and lesbians. But there is little
sign of change in the United States, notwithstanding the decision in Ro-
mer v. Evans and the progress being made toward the passage of ENDA.
